Burgeoning public concern about environmental quality has, inevitably, had its impact on the legal system. Laws are being enacted setting quality standards, appropriating money to purchase park lands, subsidizing treatment of pollution, and creating new government regulatory agencies. It is even being recommended by a number of serious legislators that the federal constitution be amended to add a provision guaranteeing to the people an inalienable right to a decent environment.
In all the stir of legislative and political activity, insufficient attention may be given to the courts, where very significant developments are taking place. Environmental problems are not a novelty in American courtrooms. Judges have traditionally abated pollution as a nuisance, at the behest of nearby property owners; and it is quite common for government agencies to obtain judicial enforcement of their orders regulating the use of land, water and air.
During the last few years, however, a rather novel kind of court action has been developing which has important implications not only for legal institutions, but for our whole way of thinking about how to deal with environmental problems. Citizens challenged the highway department's decision to take park land for its own use, and the court noted a disturbing insensitivity on the part of the highway agency to the state's concern for the maintenance of public parks. The defendant highway department claimed it had ample authority under a broad statute which authorized it to &dquo;improve&dquo; the lands of the commonwealth ; thus, it said, it could take park land at will, and its decision to do so must be respected by the judiciary. This was too much for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Plainly annoyed by such arrogance, the court responded: &dquo;The improvement of public lands contemplated by this section does not include the widening of a State highway. It seems rather that the improvement of public lands which the legislature provided for [...] I is to preserve such lands so that they may be enjoyed by the public for recreational purposes&dquo;. The court held that before the highway department could take park land it had to go to the legislature and obtain specific authorization.
The goal was to deprive the highway agency of ultimate authority over the policy question involved and to force the legislature openly to consider and resolve the issue presented by the suit. Technically, the court ruled that the highway department lacked adequate authority to seize park land at will. Essentially, however, the purpose of the lawsuit was to put the issue before the legislature where it would have to be confronted and resolved in the full light of public attention. The court thus ruled: &dquo;It is essential to the expression of plain and explicit authority to divert park lands [...] [...] In the meantime, the Governor has stated in public and written us that he will not permit the transfer of the requisite park land&dquo;.
To be sure, such litigation does not assure that the advocates of any given position will triumph, or that the legislature will necessarily produce a wise resolution. It does, however, help to move questionable environmental decision making into a forum where issues of policy must be made and articulated openly, and where legislators must assess the political consequences of taking one position or another. Measured against a system which has been characterized by its responsiveness to particular and limited perspectives, and by its penchant for quiet resolution of potential conflict (often revealed in the attitude that the less the public knows, the less trouble there will be), judicial intervention of the type described above is a significant step forward.
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